mentioned, the second civil chamber of the Supreme Court confirms an important principle of law in respect of that contract.
The court case stems from a private document signed by the parties, by which a party had made an irrevocable offer to purchase a property for a certain price, one share to be paid as a deposit and the remainder as detailed in the following preliminary, which was to be concluded within 30 days. Agreement, however, never entered into as a result of the refusal to comply with the aspiring buyer, after it had been communicated to the acceptance of the proposal. The Supreme Court resolves
moving the issue of the legal classification of the negotiation between the parties. In this case, the Supreme Court shall define the agreement at issue in terms of "pre-preliminary" as such without binding on the parties, according to the majority views expressed in doctrine and jurisprudence.
The Supreme Court takes this opportunity to clarify that "where, for the purposes of a transaction, the parties commit themselves to conclude a future contract with binding effects that constraints to conclude after the final sale, where the prospective purchaser would formalize a 'offer, without passage of money, which follows the acceptance of the seller, the agreement reached between the parties should be regarded only as preliminary preliminary contract - technically be placed in the negotiation phase, even in the advanced state of "punctuation" - intended to provide the content of the next store, but without binding on the parties. "
There is, in fact, in our legal system a preliminary draft contract of the same validity and effectiveness of the preliminary agreement and that as art. 2932 cc establishes a direct and necessary link between the instrumental and the final draft contract, for to implement effectively the planned structure of interest by the parties.
L 'obligation to be bound would result in only around a useless and inconclusive procedural, not supported by any real interest worthy of protection under the law: it has no practical sense to promise now, after promising something, rather than promise that now.
In this sense, the sentence no 8038/09 of the Supreme Court does not depart from the doctrine followed by the dominant and the case where it is stated that the agreement between the parties, and pre-qualified as preliminary, should be considered invalid for lack of cause. The same is, accordingly, explanation of the negotiations, even in the advanced state of "punctuation", as such, intended to provide the contents of the next shop but without binding on the parties.
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